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THE FIRST AMENDMENT FIGHTS BACK: A
PROPOSAL FOR THE MEDIA TO RECLAIM THE
BATTLEFIELD AFTER THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
-James Madison'
The Persian Gulf War renewed American patriotism and restored the
pride that American soldiers had lost in Vietnam. 2 However, behind this
veil of national fervor, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm also
provided for one of the First Amendment's most crushing defeats.3 Public
opinion polls show that the American public's highest priority was winning
the war, regardless of the cost to press freedoms. 4 While the public tolerated
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 Tam WarINas OF
JA Es MADIsON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 110-11 (1973).
2. See Ron Dorfman, Censored, N.W. PmsP., Fall 1991, at 34, 35 (asserting that
military's control over media assured favorable coverage of Persian Gulf War and exorcised
ghosts left by unfav6rable press coverage during Vietnam); David Lamb, Liberating Kuwait
Buries the Past, Resurrects Pride in Being a Soldier, L.A. Tmms, Mar. 3, 1991, at M4
(describing how military victory by United States in Persian Gulf War restored pride that
American soldiers had lost in Vietnam).
3. See Tom Wicker, A Free Press Was One Casualty of the Gulf War, L.A. DAMY J.,
Mar. 25, 1991, at 6 (asserting that United States government manipulated media more during
Persian Gulf War than in any other conflict of war); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. (stating
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press").
4. GANNTF FOUNDATION, THE MEDIA AT WAR: Tn PRass Alm Ta PERSIN GuLF
CoNmucT, 80, 83, 86-95 (1991) [hereinafter Tan MEDIA AT WAR] (available from Gannett
Foundation) (stating public opinion polls showed public more concerned with victory in Persian
Gulf War than with freedom of press) (citing Gannett Foundation Poll (Aug. 2, 1990-Mar.
10, 1991)). The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, a non-profit research institute at
the University of Connecticut, compiled data for this poll. Id. at 86. The Roper Center collects
survey data from about 51 polling organizations with survey sample sizes variying from 412
to 1,208. Id. During the time period of the study, approximately 2,500 poll questions involved
various aspects of the the gulf war, and 92 of these questions concerned media coverage issues.
Id. Overall, respondents favored censorship of the media during the gulf crisis, although most
respondents said the media did a good job of reporting on the war. Id. at 87, 91. In one poll
cited by the study, however, 57 percent of the respondents said that the media should be able
to accompany American forces into combat zones. Id. at 87. The Gannett Foundation Poll
included surveys conducted by nine of the nation's leading polling organizations. Id. at 86.
Some of the polls the Gannett Foundation Poll included were: the Times Mirror Center for
People and the Press Poll (Jan. 25-27, 1991) (showing 57 percent of respondents thought
military should assert more control over how news organizations report about the gulf war),
cited in Tam MEDIA AT WAR, supra at 91; Times Mirror Center for People and the Press Poll
(Mar. 14-18, 1991) (determining that most respondents are satisfied with amount of censorship
imposed by military during gulf war and that two-to-one respondents answered that they felt
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censorship and unprecedented restrictions on reporters' access to the battle-
field,5 the press failed to protest the restrictions with one collective voice.
6
Journalists and First Amendment scholars agree that the media lost the
.battle for information during the Persian Gulf War.
7
As in other military conflicts, the Department of Defense (DOD)
restricted the information which the media both could have access to and
could publish during the Persian Gulf War.8 The DOD ground rules estab-
lished twelve categories of information, such as the specific numbers of
troops and troop movements, on which the press could not report.9 In
that military censorship is more important than media's ability to report war news), cited in
THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra at 83; Gallup Organization Poll (Feb. 15, 1991) (finding that 65
percent of respondents preferred American reporters reporting only stories cleared by Iraqi
censors, instead of not reporting from Iraq at all), cited in THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra at 92.
5. THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 80 (stating public opinion polls showed public
was willing to sacrifice freedom of press for victory in Persian Gulf War).
6. See id. at xi (stating that press failed to band together and organize strategy to
protest military press restrictions, such as censorship and limitations on access to combat
zones).
7. See, e.g., Press Lost Persian Gulf Information War; Should United for Access,
Report Says, P.R. NEwswnE, June 19, 1991 (publicizing release of Gannett Foundation report,
TaM MEDIA AT WAR, asserting that media allowed military to censor reports and limit right
of access to battlefield); Gannett Foundation Makes Major Announcements, P.R. NEwswIR,
June 19, 1991 (publicizing release of Gannett Foundation report, Tan MEDIA AT WAR, asserting
that media should develop workable plan for coverage before next military conflict); Frederick
Schauer, Parsing the Pentagon Papers, HARv. UNIV. RESEARCH PAPER R-3 5-6 (1991) (asserting
that Pentagon Papers case did not secure press's right of access to information, as demonstrated
by press restrictions during gulf war); see also For Better War Coverage, Everyone Out of the
Pool, NEWSDAY, July 8, 1991, at 32 (stating that top news executives presented report to
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, complaining about press restriction during Persian Gulf
War).
8. See DOD OPERATION DESERT SHIELD GROUND RULES AND SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES
(Revised Jan. 14, 1991) [hereinafter GROUND RULES AND GUIDEUiNEs], reprinted in Nation
Magazine v. United States Dept. of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(explaining security review process to which reporters must submit before reporters can release
information to public); DOD CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
(Jan. 30, 1991) [hereinafter POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES], reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-81 (setting forth criteria for admission into DOD press
pools); see also Sean Scally, Press Restrictions in Gulf War Revive 'Right to Know' Debate,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1991, at 40, 41 (setting forth that press pool regulations adopted during
gulf war were modeled on, but not identical to, press pool regulations developed during
Grenada and Panama conflicts).
9. See GROUND RtLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 8, reprinted in Nation Magazine,
762 F. Supp. at 1581-82 (explaining ground rules of security review process that reporters must
submit to before reporters can release information to public). The DOD stated that the media
should not report the following information because publication or broadcast could jeopardize
operations or endanger lives:
(1) For U.S. or coalitional units, specific numerical information on troop strength,
aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks,
radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by
or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general
terms such as "company- size," "multi-battalion," "multi-division," "naval task
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addition to the ground rules, the DOD developed supplementary guidelines
that required media reports to go through a security review process before
release to the public. 10 The supplementary guidelines afforded reporters the
force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies
may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."1
(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes,
including postponed or cancelled operations.
(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location
of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encamp-
ments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify
the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming
from the the "Persian Gulf, .... Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written
in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti
border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the
report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged
its participation.
(4) Rules of engagement details.
(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and
results.
(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements,
tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or
lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly
forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or carrier
based.
(8) Information on the effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, target-
ing, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while
search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air ops angles of attack or speeds,
or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast"
may be used.
(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against
U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of
specific U.S. or coalition units until that information no longer provides tactical
advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and
casualities may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."
Id.
10. See DOD GumEINEs FOR NEWS MEDIA (Revised Jan. 14, 1991) [hereinafter GUME-
1UNES FOR NEws MEnIA], reprinted in Nation Magazine v. United States Dept. of Defense, 762
F. Supp. 1558, 1577-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining supplementary guidelines of security review
process that reporters must submit to before reporters can release information to public). The
DOD stated that:
In the event of hosilities, pool products will be subject to review before release
to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities,
operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the
outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be
examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential
to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on
scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and
in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter
about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed material to JIB Dhahran
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opportunity to challenge the security review process." Given the importance
of timeliness in reporting war news, however, the time-consuming review
process functioned as de facto censorship.' 2 Most journalists did not contest
the review process, however, because the journalists believed that the rules
advanced legitimate security concerns. 3 The media, nevertheless, did contest
the DOD supplementary guidelines that limited the media's access to the
battlefield. 4 These access limitations were more restrictive on the press in
duration and effect than any limitations the government had imposed on
the press in any other conflict.'" The press's major obstacle in covering the
gulf war was not dodging bullets, but getting the story.'
6
The DOD prevented reporters from getting the story by limiting re-
porters' access to the battlefield. The DOD created this obstacle in response
to the large number of reporters assigned to cover the gulf war. 17 More
than 1,400 journalists, photographers and news media personnel descended
upon the desert during the gulf war to report on the conflict.'" The DOD
resolved the logistical problem of fighting a war in the midst of so many
reporters by creating "press pools."' 19 Press pools are small groups of
reporters who have been given access to cover events when security or
logistical concerns prevent full coverage by all available reporters. 20 Because
for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no
agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA)
for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication
will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.
Id.; see also infra notes 19-21, 34-49 and accompanying text (defining and discussing use of
DOD press pools during gulf war).
11. See Tim MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 18 (explaining that reporters could challenge
security review process).
12. See THn MEDIA AT WA, supra note 4, at 17-18 (explaining time consuming security
review process and how war news is often perishable commodity); see also GuiDaU4s FoR
NEws MEDIA, supra note 10, reprinted in Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577-78 (explaining
security review process to which reporters must submit to before release of such information
as sensitive news reports, photographs, and videotapes).
13. See TH MEDIA AT WA, supra note 4, at xii, 26-32 (stating results of Gannett
Foundation Poll based on interviews with 43 journalists, military accredited to be in Persian
Gulf region during gulf war).
14. See id. at 26 (stating that media's greatest complaint was lack of access to battlefield).
15. See Wicker, supra note 3, at 6 (asserting that United States government manipulated
media more during gulf war than in any other conflict of war); see also infra notes 144-66
and accompanying text (discussing history of military restrictions on press coverage during
American conflicts of war).
16. See Tan MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 29 (explaining press's frustration over
military restrictions on media access, based on interviews with over 43 journalists who had
covered gulf war, and on interviews with other well-known journalists).
17. See id. at 18, 26-28 (recognizing logistical problem of large number of press who
desired access to combat zones).
18. Id. at 26.
19. See POOL MEM]BESRnW AND OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-81 (explaining structure of DOD press pool system).
20. See Thomas G. Havener, Note, Assault on Grenada and the Freedom of the Press,
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the press pool system severely limited the number of reporters who could
gain access to the battlefield, the DOD press pools became the subject of
much controversy during the gulf war.
2'
At the center of this controversy were two lawsuits which charged that
the DOD press pool system was an unconstitutional limitation on the press's
right of access to the battlefield.2 On January 10, 1991, the Center for
Constitutional Rights was the first organization to file an action against the
DOD on behalf of thirteen United States news organizations and writers,
including Nation Magazine.Y One month later, Agence France-Presse (AFP),
a French News Agency that the DOD had excluded from the press pools,
filed a second suit against the DOD.24 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York consolidated these two suits into Nation
Magazine v. United States Dept. of Defense.Y Although Nation Magazine
addressed censorship concerns, the plaintiffs primarily sought to contest
governmental restrictions on media access during wartime, particularly re-
garding the military's press pool membership and operating procedures.
26
Addressing plaintiffs' concerns over access restrictions, the court in
Nation Magazine first recognized that the case presented an important and
36 CASE W. Rzs. L. RPv. 483, 510-11 (1986) (defining ptess pools and asserting that press
pools are compromise solution to problem of balancing media's right of access to battlefield
and military's need for operational security).
21. See THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 17-33 (explaining frustrations of journalists
caused by gulf war's press pool system).
22. See Nation Magazine v. United States Dept. of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1560
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that case combined two causes of action, Center for Constitutional
Rights brought first cause of action on behalf of Nation Magazine and other plaintiffs, Agence
France-Presse brought second cause of action).
23. See THE MEnr& AT WAR, supra note 4, at 21 (describing history of filing of Nation
Magazine action against DOD); see also Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1558 (providing
background information on plaintiffs and filing of case). The other plaintiffs to the suit
included Harper's Magazine, In These Times, Pacific News Service, The Guardian, The
Progressive Magazine, Mother Jones Magazine, The L.A. Weekly, The Village Voice, The
Texas Observer and Pacifica Radio News. Id. The following writers also joined the suit as
plaintiffs: Sydney H. Schanberg, E.L. Doctorow, William Styron, Michael Klare and Scott
Armstrong. Id.
24. See THE MEDiA AT WA, supra note 4, at 21 (describing history of filing of Nation
Magazine action against DOD).
25. 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
26. Nation Magazine v. United States Dept. of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1561
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also infra notes, 52-55, 188 and accompanying text (describing consti-
tutional allegations brought by Nation Magazine plaintiffs). The Nation Magazine plaintiffs
primarily alleged that the press has an unlimited First Amendment right of access to a foreign
arena where American military forces are involved. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561.
The plaintiffs alleged that the DOD press pool regulations, which limited the number of press
representatives granted access and which imposed certain restrictions on the press representa-
tives, violates the First Amendment right to gather the news. Id. One of the plaintiffs, Agence-
France Presse, a wire service which the DOD excluded from the press pool, also claimed that
the DOD press pool regulations violated the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process because
the DOD did not provide Agence France-Presse with a forum to contest its exclusion from
the DOD wire services press pool. Id. at 1563.
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novel question concerning the role of the First Amendment during wartime. 27
The court, however, dismissed the complaint on April 16, 1991, after the
Persian Gulf War ended. 28 The court reasoned that the dismissal was proper
because the DOD had since lifted the restrictions and currently was in the
process of reviewing the regulations for probable revisions. 29 The court also
noted the recurring problem of mootness, stating that the unique circum-
stances of each war may call for a new set of guidelines in the future. 0
The court further criticized plaintiffs for not focusing the case by devising
specific alternatives to the DOD pool system implemented during the gulf
war.3' The court stated that if the plaintiffs had provided specific alterna-
tives, the court would have had a more focused controversy and could have
determined whether the pool system used during the gulf war unjustifiably
restricted media access.
32
The district court's dismissal of Nation Magazine due to the lack of a
well-focused controversy demonstrates that the courts will not accept an
absolutist claim that press pools are always an unconstitutional limitation
on access to the battlefield.3 3 Although the absolutist approach of the
plaintiffs in Nation Magazine is not an effective method of contesting the
press pools, the press pool system that the DOD implemented during the
gulf war was, in fact, unnecessarily restrictive and did violate the rights of
the press to report on the war. The media should propose specific alternatives
to the structure of the DOD press pool system that will provide greater
protection for the press's right of access in future conflicts.
The DOD created the structure of the press pool system by dividing
the pools according to the type of communication medium.3 For example,
27. Id. at 1571. Judge Leonard Sand stated that the case presented a novel question
concerning two firmly established rights. Id. These rights include the right of the American
public to be informed, and the need to limit information for national security concerns. Id.




32. See id. at 1575 (explaining that plaintiffs' failure to propose specific alternatives to
DOD press pool system gave court cause to exercise discretion and dismiss case due lack of
well-focused controversy).
33. See id. (criticizing plaintiffs' absolutist approach that all press pools are unconsti-
tutional).
34. See POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-79 (characterizing press pool divisions and requirements
for entry into press pools). The DOD divided the media into the following pool divisions:
television, radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, photo, and pencil (print reporter).
Id. at 1578. The DOD divided the photo category-into four subcategories of wire, newspaper,
magazine, and photo agency. Id. at 1579. Participants could take part only in one subcategory.
Id. The DOD formed the general category of "pencil" to allow the print media coordinator
to assign print reporters to smaller pools. Id. All print reporters could participate. Id. The
DOD also formed the Saudi and International pools, which did not make distinctions based
on media category. Id. The DOD created these pools for media organizations which did not
principally serve the American public or have a long-term presence covering DOD military
operations. Id. Competition to gain access to these pools was less severe. Id.
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television reporters and magazine reporters comprised two separate respective
pools. 3 The DOD did not allow all eligible pool nembers to cover the
same event at the same time.3 6 Instead, the DOD gave a certain number of
media organizations, which met press pool criteria, access to military events
on a rotating basis. 37 The DOD required each pool to appoint a coordinator
to serve as a contact person and to resolve disputes within the pools. 3 DOD
regulations also required pool members with access to the press pools to
share all media products with other eligible pool participants in their
medium. 39 The regulations did not require pool members to distribute
information to media members who did not meet DOD criteria for pool
admission. 40 Non pool media members had to rely on official military press
briefings or the generosity of pool members for news.
4'
In addition to these regulations, the DOD press pool system imposed
several unnecessarily restrictive rules on the press.4 2 One of the most
restrictive features of the DOD's press pool system was the requirement
that only representatives of major media organizations, which had a long-
time presence covering DOD military operations, could gain admission to
the pools.4 3 This admission requirement severely limited the number of
35. See POOL MEMBERSHIP AN OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-79 (setting.forth press pool divisions and requirements
for entry into press pools).
36. See id. (setting forth press pool divisions and requirements for entry into press
pools).
37. Id.
38. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1564.
39. See DOD SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITmN Tm CENTCOM POOLS (Jan. 30,
1991), reprinted in Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1579-80 (describing requirement for
sharing pool products). Participants in each medium determined the procedures for sharing
pool products and operating expenses of the pool. Id.
40. See POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-79 (setting forth press pool divisions and requirements
for entry into press pools); see also Tim MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 19 (describing how
press pool members assumed pool responsibilities). Some pool reporters took their obligations
to the pool seriously, whereas others refused to abandon traditional journalistic competition
and provide eligible pool members with useful information. Id. at 19. Infighting among pool
members was common. Id. at 28.
41. See Tim MEDIA AT WA, supra note 4, at 18-19 (describing available alternatives for
reporters not meeting press pool criteria).
42. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (setting forth DOD censorship system
and press pool regulations).
43. See POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPEATIN PROCEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp.at 1578-79 (setting forth press pool divisions and requirements
for entry into press pools). The DOD required the members of the media who do not
principally serve the American public to participate in the CENTCOM media pool international
category. Id. at 1578. The DOD also created the Saudi pool for reporters chosen by the Saudi
Ministry of Information in the JIB - Dhahran. Id. The Saudi reporters had to speak and write
English and file their reports in English. Id. at 1579. The DOD opened the television and wire
services category to the major networks and wire services. Id. The DOD also opened the news
magazine category to major national news magazines serving a general news function. Id. The
DOD divided the newspaper category into two groups. Id. The first group included those
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media representatives assigned to each pool." At the height of the gulf war,
the DOD had allowed only 192 press corp members to join military units
through membership in one of twenty-four press pools.
45
Even though the DOD gave a limited number of media organizations
access to the press pools, the DOD military guidelines also severely limited
the pool reporters' freedom in reporting. 6 Not only did the DOD require
pool reports to undergo security clearance, but the DOD also required that
reporters have a military escort under certain circumstances. 47 Although the
DOD stated in the guidelines that the DOD created this requirement to
protect journalists' safety, the requirement also effectively inhibited soldiers
from speaking openly with reporters.48 These requirements, which formed
the basis for the DOD press pool system, existed for the duration of the
gulf war and became the subject of much controversy concerning the tension
between the First Amendment right of access and national security.
49
Nation Magazine underscores the tension between the military and the
media and demonstrates that the courts will be reluctant to declare that
press pools used during wartime are unconstitutional per se. s0 Nation Mag-
azine articulates the need for a strategy to enhance the press's First Amend-
ment right of access to the battlefield in future conflicts. The media should
base this strategy on the revision of DOD press pool regulations to allow
members of the media who represent more diverse interests to join the press
pools. Taking into consideration the unpredictable aspects of each military
conflict, the DOD also should establish an accelerated system of adminis-
trative review for media organizations which claim that the DOD unreason-
ably has denied them access to the battlefield. Upon request, federal courts
then should provide an accelerated review of the DOD's findings. Upon the
cooperation of the military and the media, this strategy to protect the press's
right of access in future military conflicts can succeed." The first step
toward restructuring the DOD's regulation of the press in future military
newspapers providing continuous or near-continuous coverage in Saudi Arabia since the early
stages of the operation, such as the New York Times, Cox, Knight Ridder, Wall Street Journal,
Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Boston Globe. Id.
The DOD included all other newspapers in the second category. Id.
44. See Tim MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing DOD press pool system).
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also GuIDELINEs FOR NEws MEDIA, supra note 10, reprinted in Nation
Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577-78 (setting forth DOD procedures that pool reports must
undergo, and limitations that pool reporters must submit to while reporting).
47. See TBm MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 18-19 (describing DOD security review
process).
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id.
50. See Nation Magazine v. United States Dept. of Defense, 762 F.Supp. 1558, 1575
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (criticizing plaintiffs' absolutist approach that all press pools are unconstitu-
tional).
51. See Norman Redlich, Can a 'Free' Press Cover a War?, FREE SPEECH AND NAT'L
SEcUrY 159 (1991) (stating that like partners in uneasy marriage military and media can
work together and facilitate wartime media coverage).
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conflicts is to understand how a modern court might define the press's right
of access during wartime.
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR
DECIDING Nation Magazine
In defining the press's right of access to information during wartime,
the Nation Magazine plaintiffs first claimed that the First Amendment gives
the press an unlimited right of access to a foreign arena in which American
military forces are engaged. 2 The plaintiffs asserted that the denial of an
unlimited right of access in the form of press pools is an unconstitutional
limitation on the media's right to gather and report news. 53 The media
plaintiffs further asserted that the DOD may not limit access to the battle-
field unless military plans, secrets, operational information or strategic
sessions are involved-A4 Plaintiffs suggested, however, that they did not seek
to expand their constitutional right to access because they did not seek
access to secret information, but instead that they sought to observe events
as the events overtly occurred in an allegedly open area. 5
Plaintiffs claimed that the press pools created an unconstitutional lim-
itation on plaintiffs' right to gather and report news. In response, the
Nation Magazine court recognized that plaintiffs' claim encompassed a
question of first impression because a court had never explored the First
Amendment right of access to the battlezone. 56 The court, however, declined
to explore this constitutional question, stating that it would wait for another
case in which the controversy was more sharply focused. 7 If the court had
decided to try Nation Magazine on its merits, however, prior case law
establishing the press's right of access to information and freedom from
prior restraint would have been the foundation for such exploration.
58
A. Prior Restraint
The Supreme Court has addressed the interests of the First Amendment
and national security on a number of occasions. 59 These cases involving
52. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561, 1571.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2, Nation Magazine v. United States
Dept. of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (91 Civ. 0238 (LBS)) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memorandum] (setting forth grounds for plaintiffs' suit).
56. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561.
57. Id. at 1572.
58. See infra notes 59-143 and accompanying text (discussing case law concerning First
Amendment guarantee of right of access to information and freedom from prior restraint).
59. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (holding that prior restraint against
press is assumed unconstitutional, with exception of national security); see also Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980) (holding that former C.I.A. agent violated obligation
to submit writings to C.I.A. for pre-publication review merited by national security concerns
and personal safety of other C.I.A. agents); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 725-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (supporting freedom from prior restraint of
publication of historical overview of ongoing Vietnam War).
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national security, however, have arisen in the context of a prior restraint.60
A prior restraint is any attempt by the government or courts to mandate
the content of printed matter in advance of publication or broadcast .6 A
prior restraint is, in essence, a form of pre-publication censorship 2 that
violates the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press.
Like censorship, a prior restraint prevents the public from receiving ideas
and information." Traditionally, the courts have recognized a heavy pre-
sumption against upholding a prior restraint.
6
1
The Supreme Court emphasized the presumption against prior restraint6
in the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota.67 In Near the editor of the The
Saturday Press, a tabloid journal, challenged a Minnesota statute that
provided for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of "malicious, scandalous,
and defamatory" publications.6 The statute further stated that if a court
found any person guilty under the statute, the court could enjoin that
person permanently from further publication of malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory matter. 69 According to the statute, once a court found a news-
paper guilty, the newspaper could seek pre-publication review70 as a safe-
guard against a permanent injunction.7' The Supreme Court in Near declared
60. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (recognizing that prior restraint against press is assumed
unconstitutional, with exception of national security); New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714
(stating that there is "heavy presumption" against constitutional validity of prior restraint);
see also Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561 (exploring prior case law balancing First
Amendment right of freedom of press against national security concerns).
61. See Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (defining concept of prior restraint as essence of censor-
ship); see also RALPH L. HOLSuNoER, MEDIA LAW 509 (1987) (defining prior restraint as any
attempt by government or courts to mandate content of printed matter and as form of
censorship that violates First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press).
62. See Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (defining concept of prior restraint as essence of censor-
ship); see also BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 224 (6th ed. 1991) (defining censorship). Black's Law
Dictionary defines censorship as the following:
Review of publications, movies, plays, and the like for the purpose of prohibiting
the publication, distribution, or production of material deemed objectionable as
obscene, indecent, or immoral. Such actions are frequently challenged as constituting
a denial of freedom of press and speech,
Id.
63. See HOLSL1NGER, supra note 61, at 509 (defining prior restraint as any attempt by
government or courts to mandate content of printed matter; form of censorship that violates
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press).
64. Id.
65. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 719 (1931) (setting forth that history of
liberty of press has meant immunity from prior restraint or censorship); see also New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (setting forth in per curiam opinion that
government must satisfy heavy burden when seeking prior restraint).
66. Near, 283 U.S. at 716, 719.
67. 283 U.S. 697 (1971).
68. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701-02 (1971).
69. Id. at 702-03.
70. Id. at 711-13.
71. See id. at 711-13 (setting forth that newspaper would seek pre-publication review by
court for malicious, scandalous and defamatory content and explaining statute was, in essence,
resulting in judicial censorship).
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that the Minnesota statute was unconstitutional on the grounds that the
First Amendment historically gave the press immunity from pre-publication
review and censorship.72 However, the Court carved out narrow exceptions
in which prior restraint was permissible, such as the publication of the
location and numbers of troops during wartime.
73
Forty years later in New York Times Co. v. United States,74 the Supreme
Court found that Near did not fully address conflicts between national
security and prior restraint. 75 In New York Times, commonly known as the
Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court ruled that the government could
not enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing
classified information relating to the history and past conduct of the ongoing
Vietnam War, despite the government's allegations that the publication
threatened national security.76
The plaintiffs alleged that in seeking injunctions against publication of
the Pentagon Papers, the government was attempting to inflict an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on the press.77 Although no single theory carried
even a plurality of the Court, the Court's per curiam opinion did recognize
that a strong presumption exists against a prior restraint.78 Because of that
presumption, the Court found that the government carried a heavy burden
in implementing a prior restraint against the media.79 Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion required that the government prove to the Court's
satisfaction that publication of the Pentagon Papers would result in direct,
immediate and irreparable damage to the war movement or to national
security. 0 In setting this standard Justice Stewart emphasized the value of
a free press to the security of the American democratic system."' Justice
Black's concurring opinion stressed that the government must tolerate an
overzealous press in order to safeguard the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech to the press and public and to protect the people's right to
know through access to information.12 Given these values, the Court denied
72. Id. at 716.
73. Id.
74. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
75. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971).
76. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam); id. at 718 (Black, J. concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 714.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 729. Justice Stewart recognized the importance of the principle of separation
of powers and stated that the press served as a check on executive policy and power in areas
of national defense and foreign affairs. Id.
82. See id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring) (stressing security of United States depends on
role of free press); see also United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 403 U.S. 714 (1971) (same). In United States v. New York Times Co.,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a temporary restraining
order against the New York Times, but refused to grant'the government's request for a
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the government's request that the Court restrain the publication of the
Pentagon Papers.83
The media heralded the Pentagon Papers case as an important First
Amendment victory, with the press triumphing over the government's at-
tempt to suppress the publication of secret military information. In the
Pentagon Papers case freedom of the press outweighed the government's
concern with national security.8 However, the media could construe the
victory that the Pentagon Papers case provided as somewhat hollow. The
six member per curiam opinion implied that the government could enjoin
the media from publishing truthful matters of public interest if the govern-
ment had acquired sufficient proof of some serious effect on the war
movement or on national security."5 Two Justices also noted that the case's
outcome may have been different if a federal statute provided for an
injunction against publication of such potentially sensitive material during
wartime, or if the government had more time to develop its defense. 6 By
providing scenarios where national security concerns would outweigh the
presumption against prior restraint, the case encouraged self-censorship by
the press, as the press began to exercise greater restraint before publishing
sensitive information.17 The Pentagon Papers case also possibly paved the
way for future government censorship based on wartime security concerns. 8
permanent injunction. Id. at 331. The court reasoned that:
The security of the nation is not at the ramparts alone. Security also lies in
the value of our free institutions. A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a
ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even
greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know. In this
case there has been no attempt by the government at political suppression. There
has been no attempt to stifle criticism. Yet in the last analysis, it is not merely the
opinion of the editorial writer or the staff columnists which is protected by the First
Amendment. It is the free flow of information so that the public will be informed
about the Government and its actions.
Id.
83. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714.
84. See David Rudenstine, The Pentagon Papers Case: Recovering its Meaning Twenty
Years Later, 12 CARDozo L. Ray. 1869, 1870 (1991) (setting forth that Pentagon Papers case
is one of most significant affirmations of value to free press).
85. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(setting forth criteria by which government could restrain media). Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion noted that the Court did not have enough time to learn all of the facts of
the case, or to read the Pentagon Papers thoroughly. Id. at 731 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
86. Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring); id. at 745-46 (Marshall, J., concurring).
87. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 4-5 (asserting that Pentagon Papers leaves open
possibility of subsequent punishment, leaving non-mainstream, less powerful press especially
vulnerable).
88. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 726-63 (noting situations
where Court would find prior restraint valid as described in concurring and dissenting opinions).
Justices Brennan, White, Stewart and Marshall maintained that although a prior restraint was
improper in the Pentagon Papers case, a prior restraint may be proper in some circumstances.
Id. at 724-48 (opinions of Brennan, J., White J., Stewart, J., and Marshall, J., concurring).
Justices Burger, Harlan and Blackmun maintained that a prior restraint was appropriate in
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Although the Pentagon Papers case appeared to be a victory for
proponents of the First Amendment, the case provides little support for the
First Amendment outside the issue of prior restraint. The case sets a standard
for government censorship of information that the press has already gathered
and fails to confront the journalist's right of access to information that the
government has made unavailable.8 9 This First Amendment right became an
especially relevant concern during the Persian Gulf War, following the
enforcement of DOD press restrictions."
B. Right of Access
The media bases its complaint against the press restrictions that the
DOD applied during the gulf war on the First Amendment's guarantee of
right of access, which refers to the press's and public's freedom to gather
information. 9' The press's and public's right to speak and publish loses
meaning absent the right of access. Some commentators characterize right
of access cases as having the same detrimental effects as a prior restraint
and argue that preventing the media from attending an event is even more
restrictive than censorship. 92
The Supreme Court emphasized the detrimental effects caused by the
government limiting access to information in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,93 the first case to recognize the existence of a First Amendment
right to obtain information that is under government control. 94 In Richmond
Newspapers, a lower court granted a criminal defendant's motion to exclude
the public and the press from attending a murder trial. 9s The lower court
agreed with the government's allegation that the criminal defendant had a
the Pentagon Papers case. Id. at 748-63 (Burger, C.J., Harlan, J., and Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.17,
at 975-78 (4th ed. 1991) (noting situations where Court would find prior restraint valid as
described in concurring and dissenting opinions).
89. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 5 (emphasizing that Pentagon Papers case proved to
be incomplete victory for First Amendment). The Pentagon Papers only discussed the issue of
prior restraint and did not discuss the freedom from subsequent punishment or right of access
to information. Id. The Persian Gulf War brought the debate over right of access to information
into focus. Id.
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. See HoLsLiNoER, supra note 61, at 510 (defining public's right of access to all
information regarding government action).
92. See Roger W. Pincus, Note, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the
Need for a New Analytical Framework, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 813, 819-23 (1987) (asserting that
government's denial of press's access to battlefield should undergo "strict scrutiny" test or
"time, place and manner" analysis); see also Diane Zimmerman, Private' War: The Problem
of Access, FaR SPEECH AND NAT'L SEcUzRr 184-89 (1991) (asserting that if courts fail to
enforce right of access during military conflicts, history demonstrates that public will encourage
elected officials to enforce First Amendment).
93. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
94. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
95. Id. at 560.
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Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and that publicity would destroy the
trial's integrity.96 The government also argued that the Constitution does
not provide for the public's right to attend criminal trials and that nowhere
is such a right protected.
97
Plaintiffs, Richmond Newspapers and two of its reporters, alleged that
the press and the public have a constitutional right to attend criminal trials
and that the lower court could have ensured the criminal defendant a fair
trial through means other than closing the courtroom. 9 Although the
criminal trial that plaintiffs sought to attend had ended, the Supreme Court
in Richmond Newspapers determined that the case was not moot. 99 Instead,
the Court issued a holding because the Court found that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the government would seek to exclude the public from
other criminal trials in the future.100
The Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers consequently held that
the First Amendment implicitly granted the press and the public the right
to attend criminal trials, and without that right, the government could
destroy key aspects of freedom of speech and of the press.'0' However, the
Court noted that a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials was
not absolute and that the courts could close criminal trials if there was a
specific overriding interest. 02 The Court, in deciding Richmond Newspapers,
strongly considered the history of openness to the criminal justice system
and the importance of an informed American citizenry.'0 3
After determining in the tradition of Richmond Newspapers that the
media historically has enjoyed a right of access to an event and that
this right serves an important public function, a court must apply the
proper test for protecting access. 0 4 In Globe Newspaper v. Superior
96. Id. at 564.
97. Id. at 575, 579.
98. Id. at 560.
99. Id. at 563.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (recognizing First
Amendment protection to newsgathering, or right of access to information)).
102. Id. at 581. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, provided a specific test to
determine if the Court should let the media exercise its First Amendment right of access. Id.
at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that the Court should look to the
existence of a tradition of a right of access to proceedings or information in order to determine
whether granting press access to a trial was appropriate in a particular case. Id. Justice Brennan
also suggested that the Court inquire whether access is integral to the governmental process at
stake. Id. at 589; see also Zimmerman, supra note 92, at 184 (asserting that Brennan's opinion,
although not endorsed, serves to provide single guide to how and where court can strike
balance between public's right to know and government's administrative and security needs).
103. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 577-78; see also Tom A. Collins, The Press Clause Construed
in Context: The Journalists' Right of Access to Places, 52 Mo. L. Rev. 751, 754 (1987)
(asserting that right of access to information provides information about government and
serves as checking function on governmental misconduct); Zimmerman, supra note 92, at 184-
89 (noting historical right of access to courtroom).
104. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (asserting
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Court,015 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its analysis in Richmond News-
papers, holding that a Massachusetts statute could not mandate a court-
room closed to the press and public during the testimony of minor
victims of sexual offenders. 0 6 The plaintiff, Globe Newspaper, alleged
that a trial court, acting in accordance with the state statute, violated the
public's First Amendment right to attend criminal trials."' 7 The government
defended the validity of the Massachusetts statute based on the government's
interest in protecting minors who were victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment and in encouraging minor victims to come
forward. 108
Confronted with the issue of whether the Massachusetts statute violated
the First Amendment, the Court in Globe stated that denial of the First
Amendment right of access should be subject to a strict scrutiny test.109
Under a strict scrutiny test, the government must justify access denial by
demonstrating the existence of a compelling government interest and by
demonstrating that the government has employed narrowly tailored means
to achieve that interest. 10 The government must articulate and support its
interests with specific findings."' The Court held that although the state's
interest in protecting minor victims of sexual offenders was compelling, the
state did not use narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest and that
the state's interest did not justify indiscriminate exclusion of the press and
public during the testimony of minor victims." 2 The government's exclusion
of the press and public did not pass the Court's strict scrutiny standard."'
The Supreme Court chose not to apply strict scrutiny to protect the
public's right of access in Cox v. New Hampshire,"4 given reasonable "time,
place and manner" considerations.". In Cox v. New Hampshire the Court
upheld a New Hampshire statute that prohibited anyone from conducting
a parade or procession on a public street without a special license. The
government had applied this statute against a Jehovah's Witness group."
6
The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated the First Amendment by
depriving plaintiffs of their freedom of religion and freedom of speech and
assembly."1
7
that right of access to courtroom subject to strict scrutiny test); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 555 (1965) (asserting that statute prohibiting public parades and processions subect to
time, place, and manner analysis).
105. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
106. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602, 610-11 (1982).
107. Id. at 603-06.
108. Id. at 607-10.
109. Id. at 606-07.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 609-10.
112. Id. at 607-09.
113. Id.
114. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
115. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941).
116. Id. at 570-71, 578.
117. Id. at 571.
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In interpreting the statute the Court accepted the government's reasoning
that the purpose of the statute was to maintain public order, and, without
maintenance of public order, the public would lose civil liberties."" The
Court ruled that as long as the government did not aim the statute at the
communicative impact of the marchers' procession, the Court could uphold
the conviction." 9 Cox v. New Hampshire demonstrated that courts will
apply mid-level scrutiny when the government restricts speech based on
reasonable time, place and manner considerations. 20 Mid-level scrutiny
requires that restrictions serve a significant state interest, leave open alter-
native methods of communication, and that the government does not base
the restrictions on the content or subject matter of the speech.' 2,
However, in Cox v. Louisiana'2 the Supreme Court applied mid-level
scrutiny based on time, place and manner considerations to invalidate two
Louisiana statutes that prohibited the obstruction of public passages and
breach of the peace.'2 Local authorities applied the statutes against a group
of civil rights demonstrators protesting segregation, stating that the govern-
ment based the statutes on valid time, place and manner considerations and
promoted the peace. 24 The appellants alleged that the statutes were uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad and that the state applied the statutes
discriminatorily against them, depriving them of their First Amendment
right of free speech and assembly.1
Faced with determining whether the statutes violated the appellants'
First Amendment rights, the Court found that the breach of the peace
statute was unconstitutionally vague and that local authorities had acted
with completely uncontrolled discretion in applying both of the statutes
against the demonstrators. 26 The Court reasoned that as applied selectively
against certain groups, the Louisiana statutes restricted speech based on the
communicative impact of the speech and not on valid time, place and
manner considerations. 2 7 Cox v. Louisiana demonstrates that the Supreme
Court will not uphold restrictions on access without investigating the validity
of the government's claims that the government has based such restrictions
on legitimate time, place and manner considerations.
118. Id. at 574.
119. Id. at 575, 577.
120. Id. at 575-76.
121. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981) (articulating test for mid-level scrutiny as courts apply today); see also Nation Magazine
v. United States Dept. of Defense, 762 F.. Supp. 1558, 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (articulating
standard used in Heffron and reviewing cases dealing with time, place and manner analysis).
122. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
123. Cox v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965).
124. Id. at 546, 550, 555-57.
125. See id. at 551-52, 555-58 (citing Court's holding and reasoning which recognizes
appellants' argument).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 555-58.
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In other decisions involving restrictions on access following Richmond
Newspapers, the courts have continued to award the media an extensive
right of access to criminal trials.'2 The courts also have extended an almost
absolute right of access to open places, including such forums as streets
and parks. 29 However; there is no right of access to forums traditionally
closed to the press and the public, such as meetings involving the internal
discussions of government officials.130 The courts have also restricted access
to places such as prisons 3 1 and military bases.
3 2
In Branzburg v. Hayes33 the Supreme Court refused to interpret the
First Amendment as extending more rights to the media than to the general
public. 3 4 Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the Court's holding in
128. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (recognizing
public's First Amendment right of access to attend criminal trials); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982) (striking down Massaschusetts statute barring
public from attending criminal trials of certain sexual offenses involving minors).
129. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (reaffirming importance and central
meaning of First Amendment rights of assembly and petition); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939) (recognizing that states may not abridge First Amendment rights of assembly
and petition).
130. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (noting that government
has inherent right to keep certain matters secret, especially matters pertaining to national
security and diplomatic affairs).
131. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (holding that First Amendment
did not give news media guaranteed right of access to jails for broadcast purposes); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974) (holding that government could bar media from
interviewing specifically designated penitentiary inmates); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding Federal Bureau of Prisons ban on press interviews with
specifically designated penitentiary inmates, because government also applied restriction against
general public); see also Collins, supra note 103, at 754 (asserting that courts should grant
media preference over public in right of access to limited public forums); Zimmerman, supra
note 92, at 184-89 (providing overview of legal precedents on right of access to information).
132. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976) (denying use of military base for
speech activities); see also John C. Cruden & Calvin M. Lederer, The First Amendment and
Military Installations, 4 DEr. C.L. REv. 845, 865-69 (1984) (asserting that government should
be able to control public access to military bases, as sole purpose of military bases is to
prepare soldiers for war); Zimmerman, supra note 92, at 187-88 (stating that restrictions on
access to military bases demonstrate judicial reluctance to second-guess judgment of military).
133. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
134. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972). In Branzburg, the Supreme Court
determined whether a reporter should be exempt from testifying before a grand jury regarding
what a confidential source told him concerning illegal drug activity. Id. at 667-71. The newsmen
who brought the action did not claim that an absolute privilege existed against such testimony,
but argued that the state must demonstrate that the information is not available from another
source, that sufficient grounds exist to believe that a reporter possesses information relevant
to the crime the grand jury is investigating, and that the need for information is sufficiently
compelling to override a reporter's First Amendment interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of sources. Id. at 680. The plaintiffs alleged that a court damages a reporter's ability to gather
information when a court forces a reporter to reveal the identity of his confidential sources.
Id. The government alleged that a reporter's sources of information are not privileged under
the First Amendment. Id. at 670. The government also alleged that the First Amendment and
a Kentucky reporter's privilege statute do not provide a reporter with greater protections
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Branzburg and have not granted the media a greater right of access to
information than the general public.135 In Pell v. Procunier136 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co. 37 the Supreme Court upheld state and federal regu-
lations that barred reporters from interviewing specifically designated prison
inmates. 3 1 In a five-four decision in Pell, the Supreme Court denied the
press access based on the Court's holding in Branzburg that the press enjoys
no greater First Amendment right of access than the public. 39 The Court
reasoned that because the government gives the public no general access to
prisons and their inmates, the regulations against media access were valid
under the First Amendment1 40
The Supreme Court has justified access limitations based on the lack
of an historically demonstrated right.' 41 Relying on history, the Supreme
against testifying before a grand jury than the average citizen. Id. The Supreme Court noted
that it is generally held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information that is not available to the public. Id. at 684-85. The
Court held that the public interest in law enforcement and grand jury proceedings is sufficiently
compelling to override any burden on newsgathering that may result when the court requires
a reporter to reveal a confidential source. Id. at 690-91. Therefore, a reporter had the same
obligation as a normal citizen to testify before a grand jury as to what his confidential source
told him. Id. at 682, 709.
135. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28, 834-35 (1974) (upholding statute barring
both reporters and public from access to specific prisoners); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding statute barring both reporters and public from access to
specific prisoners).
136. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
137. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
138. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28, 834-35 (upholding statute barring both
reporters and public from access to specific prisoners); see also Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding statute barring both reporters and public from access
to specific prisoners). In Pell the Supreme Court considered the validity of a California
Department of Corrections statute that prohibited media interviews with specific prisoners.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 819. The purpose of the statute was to prevent discipline and morale problems
within the prison. Id. The Supreme Court addressed the fact that the media does not enjoy a
greater right of access to information than the public, and that the statute also denied the
media the opportunity to interview these prisoners. Id. at 829-35. Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that alternative means of communication remained open to allow the inmates to
exercise their First Amendment rights. Id. at 824-28. The Court held that the statute did not
abridge the constitutional rights of the inmates or the press. Id. at 835. In Saxbe the Supreme
Court considered the validity of a Federal Bureau of Prison's policy statement that prohibited
any interviews between the media and specifically designated prison inmates. Saxbe, 417 U.S.
at 844. The Supreme Court refused to balance the plaintiffs' First Amendment interest against
the state's assertion that granting media interviews created discipline and morale problems in
the prison. Id. at 849. The Court stated that the issues in Saxbe were constitutionally
indistinguishable from Pell. Id. at 850. The Court therefore confirmed its decision in Pell and
held that because the statute did not deny the press the access granted to the public, the
statute was constitutional. Id.
139. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35.
140. Id.; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. In determining that the statute had not violated the
inmates' rights of free speech, the Court in Pell and Saxbe also considered the fact that the
inmates had alternate channels of communication. Pell at 827-28; Saxbe at 851.
141. See supra notes, 103-05, 128-32, 141 and accompanying text (discussing importance
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Court has restricted access to the public and media to such places as
prisons 42 and upheld public and media access to such events as criminal
trials. 43 The first step in analyzing the constitutionality of access restrictions
to the battlefield is to determine the media's involvement in prior conflicts.
1. Historical Right of Access to the Battlefield
In Nation Magazine the plaintiffs emphasized that the presence of
correspondents in the battlefield is as old as America itself.'" Since the
Revolutionary War, war correspondents have been an integral part of the
American war effort.' 4" However, the relationship between the press and
the military has been more antagonistic' than cooperative.'" This antagonism
of historically demonstrated right of access to specific places, such as right of access to
courtroom).
142. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (discussing government's restriction
of public and media access to prisons).
143. See supra notes 103-13, 128 and accompanying text (discussing right of public and
media to attend criminal trials).
144. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 55, at 25 (discussing press's historical right
of access to battlezone).
145. See MEYER L. STEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE SToRY OF AMERiCAN WAR CoRREsPoNDairrS
12-13 (1968) (discussing role of war correspondents in Revolutionary War). During the Battle
of Lexington in 1775, Isiah Thomas, a Revolutionary soldier, left the ranks of the militia to
report on the battle. Id. From this inauspicious beginning, war correspondents have reported
on every American conflict. Id.; see also id. at 13-14 (detailing role of American reporters
during various military conflicts); FREDERICK L. BULLARD, FAmous WAR CoRRmsPoNDEnrs 6,
351-74 (1914) (same); ROBERT W. DnsmoND, Tan -PrEss AND WORLD ArsAmis 17-21 (1937)
(same).
146. See Tan MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 8 (discussing antagonistic relationship
between government and media concerning restrictions on press coverage of military conflicts).
During the Civil War, the United States government began to censor news media on the
pretext of aiding the war effort. Id. at 8-9. Additionally, the government denied the press
access to battlefields during the Civil War, as a result of generals often barring reporters from
the battlefield or keeping reporters at a distance from events. Id. Despite these restrictions,
reporters from the Northern states succeeded in reporting about the war. Id. at 9. The media's
circumvention of military policies during the Civil War marked the birth of government-media
antagonism that has resurfaced in all subsequent military conflicts. Id. Following the Civil
War, the government imposed little or no limitations on the press during the Spanish-American
War. Id. However, censorship reemerged during World War I when the government imposed
rigorous censorship on any individual who the government believed was weakening the war
effort. Id. at 9-10. During World War I General John Pershing required journalists to be
accredited, and limited the number of accredited journalists to 31. Id. at 10. Unaccredited
journalists and other visitors undercut the effectiveness of this policy. Id. The severity of
government censorship during World War I brought critical response from scholars over the
next two decades. Id. The legal community adopted the consensus that during World War I
the government went much further than legitimate military considerations had warranted. Id.;
see also Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of
Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-Record Wars", 73 GEo. L.J. 931, 932-45 (1985) (providing
historical overview of developing right of access during conflicts of war). In exchange for
heavy censorship, World War II journalists had fairly wide access to the battlefield. Id. at
939. However, there were not enough reporters to cover every battle. Id. (quoting SmN, supra
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primarily has resulted from the media's reaction to military censorship
rather than from a denial of access to the battlefield. 47
The DOD departed from its practice of censoring media reports during
the Vietnam War and gave the media unprecedented press freedoms.'4
Despite growing military sentiment that the press was "losing" the war
through biased reporting, 149 virtually all reporters followed the government's
voluntary censorship policy. 50 Between 1964 and 1968 the military also
granted approximately 2,000 reporters wide access to the battlefield, which
continued regardless of how unpopular the press became with the military.'
The military allowed a large press corps to have access to military bases
and personnel and combat zones, even during active battle.1
2
During the Vietnam War, the advent of television allowed reporters for
the first time to bring the tragedy of war into American living rooms.
5
1
Radio and print media also benefitted from improvements in communica-
tions technologies." 4 In reaction to these developments, the Pentagon's
wartime news management program in 1971 began to relax its policy
concerning military censorship of the media and even chose to eliminate
the term "censorship" from the news management program's vocabulary.
5
In 1981 the Under Secretary of Defense sent a memo to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff noting that new communication and transportation technologies
had rendered field censorship obsolete.
56
note 145, at 95). During the Korean conflict, the military subjected journalists to a haphazard
system of censorship where the military expelled reporters whose stories they did not like. Id.
at 940. The media's situation became so desperate that members of the media banded together
and requested that the military impose full, compulsory censorship. Id. Ninety percent of the
correspondents supported this request. Id.; see also JOSEPH J. MATnEWs, REPORTING Tm
WARs, at 198 (1957) (describing press's role in American military conflicts). The London Daily
Dispatch wrote that the resulting censorship was so strict "that it was no longer officially
possible to say anything about United Nations troops other than that they were in Korea."
PHmiLP KNIGHT=E, THE FIRST CASUALTY - FROM THE CRIMEA TO VIETNAM: THE WAR CoR-
REsPONDENT AS HERO, PROPAGANDIST AND MYTH MAER 345-46 (1975). The military relaxed
censorship restrictions after MacArthur's expulsion. Cassell, supra, at 941. Despite censorship,
American reporters were often a strong force on the front lines, as the military imposed no
access restrictions. STEIN, supra note 145, at 149-50.
147. See Cassell, supra note 146, at 939 (describing how military predominantly censored
media rather than denied media access to battlefield during prior military conflicts).
148. See STEIN, supra note 145, at 149-50 (describing media's unlimited right of access
during Vietnam War as well as military's system of voluntary, rather than compulsory,
censorship of media).
149. See THE MEDIA AT WaR, supra note 4, at 15 (describing how press enjoyed great
freedoms during Vietnam, despite growing anti-war sentiment).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 14-15.
152. Id.; see also Cassell, supra note 146, at 941-42 (describing wide press freedoms that
media enjoyed during Vietnam War).
153. See THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 15 (describing how Vietnam War coverage
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2. Grenada and the Creation of the Sidle Panel
The DOD once again imposed press restrictions on October 25, 1983,
when approximately 1,900 United States soldiers stormed the tiny island of
Grenada.5 7 Press nembers, denied access to the island until two days after
the invasion, received a rude awakening once they realized the government
had denied them access.' During the military's ban on news coverage, the
military prevented small boats that carried reporters from actually entering
the island. 59 According to DOD officials who refused to be identified by
the press, the DOD based its ban against press coverage in part on the
success of the press controls that Great Britain imposed on the media during
the Falkland Islands conflict. 6" The DOD also based its decision to break
with the tradition of open access on an overwhelming dissatisfaction with
the voluntary approach used in Vietnam.' 6' During the Vietnam War, many
military officials developed a great distrust of the media and accused the
press of contributing to the military's defeat and loss of reputation. 62 Each
day, the press brought the realities of the Vietnam War to the attention of
the American public. 63 The conventional perception that unlimited media
access caused a reversal of support for the Vietnam War is -a highly plausible
explanation for the restrictions set in place during the Grenada invasion.
64
The DOD's restrictions on media access during the Grenada invasion
inspired widespread commentary and media uproar. 65 This news blackout
157. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., In Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by U.S.
Comes to Light, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 6, 1983 at A20 (discussing government's spread of
disinformation and withholding of significant facts during invasion of Grenada).
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also Admiral Says It Was His Decision to Tether the Press, N.Y. TIms,
Oct. 31, 1983, at A12 (discussing Admiral Metcalf's battle with press). In greeting one group
of reporters on October 29, 1983, the commander of the American task force, Admiral Metcalf,
asked whether any reporters had arrived on a press boat. Id. Metcalf further warned that he
would shoot at any boat that approached the island, because of the difficulty of determining
whether its passengers were the enemy or the press. Id.
160. See Taylor, supra note 157, at 20 (discussing government's reasons for banning press
coverage during United States invasion of Grenada).
161. See Tim MEniA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing rationale for excluding
media from covering invasion of Grenada).
162. See John B. Engber, The Press and the Invasion of Grenada: Does the First
Amendment Guarantee the Press A Right of Access to Wartime News?, 58 TEMP. L.Q., 873,
878 (1985) (asserting that military believed media portrayal of Vietnam War created miscon-
ception of battle outcomes and diminished public support of military). Some military officials
accused the media of misinterpreting the effects of major events of the Vietnam War, such as
the Tet offensive. Id. Other military officials asserted that war was too traumatic for American
television to report on daily. Id.
163. Id.
164. See David Goldberg, War and the Press: U.K. versus U.S., CoNsT. MAo., Fall 1991,
at 27, 29 (equating history of onerous restrictions on wartime reporting in Great Britain to
restrictions Pentagon imposed on American press during Persian Gulf War); see also Engber,
supra note 162, at 878 (asserting that Great Britain's success in shaping public opinion by
controlling press coverage of conflict with Argentina in Falkland Islands served as model for
Pentagon during invasion of Grenada).
165. See Engber, supra note 162, at 876 (describing reaction of media and public to
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was virtually unprecedented in American history, as the press had covered
military conflicts since the Revolutionary War.66 In response to media
complaints, the DOD appointed a panel under the direction of retired Army
Major General Winant Sidle for the purpose of developing a policy regarding
the media's desire to gain access to the battlefield. 67 The Sidle Panel held
hearings in February 1984 in order to receive testimony from various
members of the media. 68 The Panel subsequently released recommendations
in August 1984 and the DOD immediately put the recommendations into
effect. 69
The recommendations, known as the Sidle Report, initially emphasized
that the United States news media must be able to cover United States
military operations as thoroughly as possible while remaining consistent
with mission security and troop safety.' 70 For the media and the military to
achieve this goal, the Sidle Panel recommended more public-affairs planning,
voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines, logistical help
offered by the military for the media as soon as possible and the operation
of the largest press pool system practical for the briefest period of time.'
7'
The Panel's comments also stressed the importance of applying guidelines
military's exclusion of media from covering Grenada invasion). Expressing anger at the ban,
journalists condemned the news blackout in fiery editorials. Id. In January 1984, 10 major
news organizations banded together to release "A statement of principle on Press Access to
Military Operations," which elaborated opposition to press bans in military operations. Id.
These organizations included the American Newspaper Publishers Association, American
Society of Magazine Editors, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press
Managing Editors, National Association of Broadcasters, Radio-Television News Directors
Association, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Society of Professional Journalists,
Sigma Delta Chi, The Associated Press, and United Press International. Id.
166. See Engber, supra note 162, at 873 (asserting importance of upholding historical
right of access to battlefield); see also supra notes 144-65 and accompanying text (discussing
history of press coverage during American military conflicts).
167. See Cassell, supra note 146, at 945 (discussing creation of Sidle Panel in response
to press's exclusion from invasion of Grenada); see also THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4,
at 15-16 (discussing creation of Sidle Panel, and Panel's findings and recommendations for
press coverage during future military conflicts).
168. See Cassell, supra note 146, at 945 (discussing history of Sidle Panel).
169. Id.
170. See CHAIRmAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF-MEDIA RELATIONS PANEL, REPORT TO
GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., (Aug. 23, 1984) reprinted in Engber, supra note 162, at 905-
15 [hereinafter SMLE PANEL REPORT]. The Sidle Panel's final report consisted of eight
recommendations, which included the recommendation that the military should use the largest
possible press pool that is practical and that the military should dissolve the press pools as
soon as full coverage is feasible. Recommendations 1-8, at 906-07.
171. SIDLE PANEL REPORT, supra note 170, Recommendations 3-5, at 906-07. The Panel's
recommendations included a statement that the press should voluntarily comply with Pentagon
rules governing media access to military operations. Id., Recommendation 4. However, viol-
ations of these "voluntary" guidelines would mean exclusion of the correspondent involved
from further coverage of the military operation. Id. According to the Panel's recommendations,
the military would establish the ground rules and security guidelines, and the military should
establish as few rules as possible. Id. The military should establish the rules during the planning
process for each operation. Id.
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similar to those used in Vietnam and noted the media's approval of all of
the Panel's recommendations. 72 The media generally agreed that the DOD
should use pool coverage only in the rare circumstances when full coverage
is impossible because of transportation, security, or other concerns. 73 The
media cautioned that the government should, as a general rule, provide
maximum media access at the earliest time possible while remaining consis-
tent with mission security and troop safety. 174
The military failed, however, to satisfy this general rule during the
Panama crisis when press pools did not reach the battle scene until after
the invasion. The pools, therefore, did not acquire any eyewitness reports
of the fighting.'75 The media subsequently agreed that by refusing to provide
access to front line operations in Panama, the DOD breached understandings
that the press had formed with the military. 76 Critics asserted that in spite
of months of research completed by the Sidle Panel in order to reach a
workable solution, the military lacked an adequate understanding of how
the news media operate.'l
The Sidle Panel's desire to reach a workable solution, coupled with the
uproar over the media's denial of access during the Grenada invasion, is
testament to the American press's historical right of access to the battle-
field.' 7 The Nation Magazine plaintiffs, as well as many members of the
172. SIDLE PANEL REPORT, supra note 170, Comments 1, 2, at 909. The Panel's comments
noted that the media supported the Sidle Panel's findings and that the media would abide by
the ground rules. Id. The Sidle Panel noted that the ground rules ideally should be similar to
those the DOD applied in Vietnam. Id.
173. See RESPONSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS TO INQUIRIES FROM
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, at 2 (Jan. 27, 1984), quoted in Havener, supra note 20, at 511
(1986) (asserting that despite problems with military press pools, pools are best solution to
problem of balancing First Amendment right of access to battlefield with military strategy and
security).
174. See RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN NEWsPAPER PtmuasHERs ASSOCIATION TO INQUIRIES
FROM THE JOInT CHIEFS OF STAFF, at 3 (Jan. 11, 1984), quoted in Havener, supra note 20, at
511 (1986) (asserting that in any instance government should provide maximum amount of
media access possible at the earliest possible time consistent with mission security and troop
safety).
175. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 55, at 15-16 (discussing military's failure
to notify media and implement press pool system during first two days of American military
invasion of Panama).
176. See id. (discussing military's failure to notify media and implement press pool system
during first two days of American military invasion of Panama).
177. See id. (discussing failure of press pool system during American military invasion of
Panama). In response to the DOD's failure to mobilize the pools during the Panama invasion,
the Pentagon commissioned the HoFMAN REPORT, which attributed the decision not to
immediately mobilize the pool system to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Id. at 16.
Following the release of the HOFFMAN REPORT, Pentagon spokesperson Pete Williams pledged
on March 20, 1990 that the DOD would try to ensure that the media could cover future
conflicts in entirety. Id. at 18; see also Havener, supra note 20, at 513 (explaining failure of
military press pools during test run in Honduras on April 21, 1985).
178. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text (describing media's right of access to
battlefield in prior American conflicts of war).
1992] 1167
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1145
media, asserted that during the gulf war the military once again failed to
follow the Sidle Panel's recommendations of open access consistent with
military strategy and safety. 179 Closely tied to this historic freedom of access
is the importance of the press holding the government accountable for its
actions.8 0 As television journalist Walter Cronkite articulated:
It is drummed into us, and we take pride in the fact that these
are 'our boys (and girls,)' 'our troops,' 'our forces' in the gulf.
They are, indeed, and it is our war. Our elected representatives in
Congress gave our elected president permission to wage it. We had
better darned well know what they are doing in our name.'
II. APPLYING Nation Magazine TO A LEGAL F.Am~wORK
Given the importance of the press's public function and the historical
support for access to the battlefront,1 2 the media deserve a more significantly
protected right of access than the DOD pool system provided during the
Persian Gulf War. The Nation Magazine court declined to determine,
however, to what extent the First Amendment guarantees the media a right
of access to the battlezone.8 3 The court in Nation Magazine characterized
the battlefield as a limited public forum and recognized that the government
could not deny the media access to a limited public forum arbitrarily.1'4
The court also stated that the logistical and safety concerns of wartime
merited the DOD's enforcement of a press pool system based on time, place
and manner considerations." 5 Time, place and manner considerations trigger
mid-level analysis.8 6 Mid-level analysis still would require that the DOD not
base its regulations on content and that the DOD regulations must serve a
significant governmental interest and must leave open alternative channels
of communication.
8 7
179. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 55, at 13-25 (noting recommendations of
Sidle Panel, and restrictive press pool regulations during gulf war); THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra
note 4, at 23 (discussing Nation Magazine plaintiffs' claim that restrictions on press access
should be no more restrictive than restrictions imposed on press during Vietnam War); see
also SIDLE PANEL REPORT, supra note 170, at 913 (noting that freedom of press that existed
during Vietnam War should be model for future military conflicts).
180. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-20 (1971) (emphasizing
importance of press holding government accountable). Justice Black wrote of the press's vital
role in checking executive power over foreign affairs. Id.
181. Walter Cronkite, What Is There to Hide, NEwswEEc, Feb. 25, 1991, at 43.
182. See supra notes 103, 144-66 and accompanying text (discussing press's role in covering
American military conflicts and acting as check on government).
183. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575 (explaining that plaintiffs' failure to
propose specific alternatives to DOD press pool system gave court cause to exercise discretion
and dismiss case due to lack of well-focused controversy).
184. Id. at 1573 (quoting Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
185. See id. at 1574 (stating that all parties agreed that DOD may place reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions on press upon showing of significant governmental interest).
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
648 (1981)).
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Falling subject to mid-level analysis, Nation Magazine addresses both
the constitutionality of press pools in general and the allegedly discriminatory
fashion in which the DOD has applied press pool regulations. 8' The court
in Nation Magazine, in response to the issues presented by the press pool
regulations, maintained that plaintiffs' crucial flaw in presenting the case
was plaintiffs' failure to articulate alternatives to the DOD's present pool
system. 18 9
The Nation Magazine court based its need for such alternatives on the
military's contention that different conflicts require different means of
control as well as the judicial system's historical reluctance to intrude on
matters traditionally left to military discretion.' 90 In Nation Magazine the
military argued that the controversy was moot due to the end of the Persian
Gulf War.' 9' The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had accepted such reasoning in Flynt v. Weinberger,92 a
case that addressed press restrictions during the Grenada conflict. The court
in Flynt dismissed the case for mootness because the Grenada conflict was
over by the time the case came to trial. 93 Unlike the court in Flynt, the
Nation Magazine court decided not to dismiss the case, although the DOD
had lifted the regulations and the Persian Gulf War was over by the time
the case came to trial.' 94 The court explained that the case was not moot
but instead qualified under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
mootness exception, because the plaintiffs could contest the DOD's press
pool regulations in future conflicts. 95 However, the court exercised its
discretion and decided not to hear the case based on the fact that different
military conflicts may merit the imposition of different press restrictions
and the fact that it was plaintiffs' duty to suggest alternatives to revise the
current DOD pool system.1 96 The court stated that although the controversy
was not moot, it lacked focus.'9
The court in Nation Magazine based its need for plaintiffs to present
a more focused controversy on the great deference the courts traditionally
188. Id. at 1570.
189. See id. at 1575 (explaining that plaintiffs' failure to propose specific alternatives to
DOD press pool system gave court cause to exercise discretion and dismiss case due to lack
of well-focused controversy).
190. See id. at 1574 (stating difficulty in predicting whether press restrictions imposed by
DOD would be reasonable time, place and manner restrictions during next military conflict);
Sean P.. Scally, Press Restrictions in Gulf War Revive 'Right to Know' Debate, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 12, 1991, at 40, 41-42 (asserting unpredictable aspects of war give DOD convenient way
to escape merits of claim that press pools are unconstitutional access restriction).
191. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561-62.
192. 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
193. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134, 134-36.
194. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1569.
195. Id.
196. See id at 1574-75 (explaining that plaintiffs' failure to propose specific alternatives
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have given to the military during wartime. 98 Although the court in Nation
Magazine was prepared to review plaintiffs' proposals for a new pool
system, the court was not prepared to rule that all press pools used during
military conflicts are unconstitutional.199 The Nation Magazine court also
refused to determine whether the press pool system that the DOD imple-
mented during the gulf war was unconstitutional because the court did not
know if the DOD could justifiably implement the pool system in future
conflicts, or even whether the DOD would create a new pool system in the
future.20 The court refused to assume the burden of determining what other
alternatives the government could have adopted to create a less discrimi-
natory pool selection process. 20' The Nation Magazine court, however, was
willing to place that burden on plaintiffs and review plaintiffs' general
proposal for revising the military press pools. 20 2 By providing alternatives,
plaintiffs could have demonstrated that time, place and manner considera-
tions did not require the DOD's press pool system to be so restrictive.
20 3
III. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT POOL SYSTEM
A. Administrative and Judicial Review
Whereas the Nation Magazine plaintiffs adhered to an absolutist ap-
proach, asserting that all press pools that restrict access to the battlefield
are unconstitutional, 204 the media should propose specific alternatives to the
press pool system that the DOD implemented during the Persian Gulf War.
Conceding that sometimes legitimate logistical and security concerns require
198. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (allowing American
military to detain Japanese-Americans in prison camps during World War II based on national
security concerns); Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference that Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence
of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 Vn.L. L. REv. 1009, 1058-59 (1990) (asserting that
judicial system gives too much deference to military when plaintiff charges military with
violating individual constitutional rights); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The American
Experience: Free Speech and National Security, FREE SPEECH AND NAT'L SECURITY 10, 16-18
(Shimon Shetreet ed., 1991) (advocating that courts should be more suspicious of asserted
national security claims); Floyd Abrams, et aL, The First Amendment and National Security,
43 U. MIMug L. REv. 61, 61-90 (1988) (debating when media should not disclose government
secrets due to national security concerns).
199. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575 (criticizing plaintiffs' "no limitation"
approach). The court noted that only Agence-France Presse's requested relief for entry into
the wire news services photo pool system was specific. Id. However, the court in Nation
Magazine held that this particular claim was moot due to the end of the gulf war. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 1575 (implying that burden is on plaintiff to devise specific alternatives to
DOD press pool system).
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1574 (asserting that DOD may place reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on press if there is significant governmental interest).
204. Id. at 1575.
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the DOD to use press pools, 2° s the DOD must develop a system of accelerated
administrative review. 2°6 Members of the media would obtain administrative
review if they felt the DOD had improperly excluded them from a pool or
if conditions had changed and no longer warranted the press pool system.
The DOD conveniently may pattern this system providing accelerated
administrative review of DOD findings regarding the press pools on the
three-tier system that the DOD used during the gulf war to review news
releases for the purpose of safeguarding military strategy or security.,, The
first stage of the review process would require a DOD administrator to
respond to complaints of improper exclusion. 208 A DOD administrator would
determine whether a media organization met press pool criteria. For instance,
Agence-France Presse, one of the plaintiffs in Nation Magazine, asserted
that it principally serves an American audience,2 which is one of the criteria
for inclusion in the DOD wire services photo pool. 210 A DOD administrator
would make findings of fact regarding this assertion. The second level of
review would enable Agence-France Presse to appeal immediately to a joint
205. See id. at 1574 (asserting that DOD may place reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on press if there is significant governmental interest); see also THE MEDIA AT WAR,
supra note 4, at 27-28 (reporting that most of 43 journalists interviewed by Gannett Foundation
acknowledged that press pools were necessary during gulf war because of confusion created
by the presence of 1,400 reporters).
206. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575 (criticizing plaintiffs for not devising
specific alternatives to press pool system, such as regulations including procedures for speedy
administrative review).
207. See Nation Magazine at 1565 (describing DOD three-tier security review process);
supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (same).
208. See Nation Magazine at 1565 (describing DOD security review process); supra notes
8-10 and accompanying text (same). Under the first stage of the DOD's three-tier system
security review process, a DOD public affairs officer could review the news that the pool
participants gathered in the field before pool participants could release the news to the public.
Nation Magazine at 1565. The three-tier review process determined if news reports might
jeopardize an operation or the security of United States or coalition troops. Id. The DOD
stated that the military would not censor news for its potential "to express criticism or
embarrassment." Id.; see also GROUND RULEs AND GuDEIMsEs, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1581 (describing criteria for military censorship of news);
supra note 9 and accompanying text (same).
209. Id. at 1562. Agence-France Presse, a news service with reporters and photographers
in the Persian Gulf, argued that by serving 24 million readers in the United States, the service
satisfied the "principally serve the American public" requirement. Id. Alternatively, Agence-
France Presse asserts that the "principally serve the American public" requirement violated
the First Amendment by functioning as content-based discrimination. Id. The Nation Magazine
court recognized the principle that content-based regulations are discriminatory and violate the
First Amendment. Id. at 1573.
210. See PooL MEMBERSHM AND OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-80 (requiring that "due to logistics and space limitations,
participation in pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and
that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except
for pool positions designated as 'Saudi' or 'International'); see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text (describing DOD press pool regulations and divisions and explaining that
Saudi and International pools received less access than other pools).
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committee comprised of the head on-site military public affairs director and
the wire services pool coordinator.2 1 If the parties once again failed to
reach a consensus, the third level of review would enable Agence-France
Presse to forward the issue immediately to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
212
This three-tier system of accelerated administrative review would require
the DOD to provide a complaining media organization, such as Agence-
France Presse, with a statement at each stage explaining the DOD's reasons
for denying access to a particular pool. The DOD also would have to
provide a similar system of administrative review to news organizations
which would charge that conditions had changed and that the DOD could
no longer justifiably continue the pool system. This system of administrative
review would require the DOD to state particular reasons for continuing
the pool system based on the situation at that particular point in time.
213
This system of administrative review also would require the DOD to enforce
the regulations evenhandedly and to explain how the press pool system is
the DOD's least intrusive alternative in balancing First Amendment concerns
with mission security and troop safety. 2 4 Although this system of admin-
211. See Nation Magazine at 1565; supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (describing
DOD security review process). In the case of disagreement between the DOD public affairs
officer and the media organization, the second stage required that the DOD send the disputed
information to the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nation Magazine,
762 F. Supp. at 1565; see also supra note 208 and accompanying text (describing first stage
of DOD security review process).
212. See Nation Magazine at 1565; supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (describing
DOD security review process). During the third stage, if the media organization and the JIB
Director did not reach a concensus, the military forwarded the issue to the Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Id. The media organization could make the ultimate
decision concerning publication. Id.; see also GROUND RuLEs AND GumirDN¢s, supra note 8,
reprinted in Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1581-83 (discussing security review process);
supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing how security review process functioned as
type of de facto censorship); supra notes 206, 209 and accompanying text (describing first two
stages of DOD security review process).
213. See Collins, supra note 103, at 770, 786 (suggesting that government must articulate
media access restrictions using understandable and reasonable standards).
214. See id. at 751, 786 (suggesting that courts require government to explain its rationale
for access restrictions, give particular reasons for restrictions, apply regulations evenhandedly
and adopt least intrusive approach). Collins bases these requirements on the Supreme Court's
endorsement of the government supplying proper notice and other procedural relief before the
government limits access to the media. Such an endorsement is seen in Pell v. Procunier where
the Court upheld a statute that prohibited media interviews with specifically designated prison
inmates. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 817-55 (1974)). The Supreme Court also
recognized the importance of proper notice and other procedural relief before the government
limited media access in Greer v. Spock, where the Court reversed an injuction permitting
access of political candidates to military base. Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-
40 (1976)). Collins then compared the approaches of the Supreme Court in Pell and Greer to
the Supreme Court's approach in two similar cases where the court gave little reason for the
government action. Id. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978) (prohibiting
television interviews of certain prisoners, but allowing other types of interviews); Flower v.
United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198-99 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing conviction of citizen for
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istrative review should not require the DOD to divulge confidential military
secrets in providing these statements, the DOD also should not be able to
implement the pool system for nebulous security and logistical reasons.
215
The courts have supported the articulation of government policies as a
prerequisite to government denial of access in a variety of circumstances
involving time, place and manner considerations. 2 6 However, Sherrill v.
Knight217 went beyond requiring a general policy statement supporting access
denial to providing an individualized system of administrative review. 21s In
Sherrill the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Secret Service could not deny a bona fide Washington
journalist a White House press pass based on vague security concerns.
21 9
trespassing on military base); see also infra notes 219, 223-24, 228 and accompanying text
(noting court's assertion in Sherrill that limitations on newsgathering must be no more restrictive
than necessary and establishing court's invocation of principles promoted in Sherrill).
215. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (asserting that
security is "broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate" First
Amendment).
216. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (advocating government supply media
with clear rationale for implementing restrictions on media access); see also Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974) (explaining government's rationale for implementing restrictions
preventing public and media from interviewing certain prisoners). For instance, in Pell, the
Supreme Court considered the validity of a California Department of Corrections regulation
which limited media access to interviews with certain specifically designated prison inmates.
Id. at 819. Three professional journalists, who wished to interview some of these prisoners,
alleged that the regulation violated the First Amendment by infringing on the press's news-
gathering activity. Id. at 820-21. Four of the inmates affected by the regulation also alleged
that the regulation infringed on their First Amendment right of freedom of expression. Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the regulation, reasoning that prison officials had
clearly articulated to the media their reasons for not allowing reporters to interview specifically
designated prisoners. Id. at 831-35. Prison officials alleged that such prisoners had gained
celebrity status with fellow prisoners that subsequently created a violent prison episode that
debilitated the prison's function. Id. The Court also noted that the California Department of
Corrections had adopted the limitations properly. Id. at 819. The regulation provided the
media with a reasoned analysis, which rationally supported the need for the particular
limitations the regulation imposed on the media. Id. at 831; see also Collins, supra note 103,
at 780 (advocating government supply media with clear rationale for implementing restrictions
on media access, as seen in Pen). Furthermore, the Pell Court emphasized that the prison also
denied the general public access to these prisoners, and that the media had no greater right
of access to information than the general public. Id. at 833-35. The Court also noted that the
plaintiff inmates had alternative methods of communication at their disposal, such as visits
with family, clergy and writing letters. Id. at 823-28.
217. 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
218. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d, 124, 130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that reporter
to whom Secret Service denied access was entitled to notice of factual basis for denial,
opportunity to respond and final written statement of reasons for denial).
219. Id. at 130. The Sherrill court noted that the court would not require the Secret
Service to provide a detailed articulation of narrow specific standards or precise identification
of factors that the Secret Service might have considered in determining whether to deny a
professional journalist, who had credentials for the House and Senate galleries, a press pass.
Id. The court stated instead that, given the circumstances, the Secret Service only must
demonstrate that the journalist potentially could cause harm to the President or his immediate
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The plaintiff in Sherrill alleged that the First Amendment protected
plaintiff's interest as a journalist in obtaining a White House press pass
and that the government's system for denying press passes violated plaintiff's
First Amendment and Due Process rights. 20 The government justified its
denial of plaintiff's request for a press pass with a one sentence statement
explaining that the government had fined the plaintiff for assault in Flor-
ida.22' The government alleged that the court should uphold its system for
granting press passes based on the compelling interest of protecting the
President's safetyYm Although the court recognized that the President's
safety is a sufficient interest, the court reasoned that restrictions on news
gathering generally must be no more restrictive than necessary, and that the
government may not exclude individual newspersons arbitrarily from sources
of information. 223 The court emphasized that once the White House had
created a limited public fortim by voluntarily establishing White House
press facilities for correspondents, the government could not deny right of
access arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons.224 In addition to a
final written statement articulating the reasons for the denial, the court in
Sherrill required notice of the factual basis for denying access and an
opportunity for the applicant to respond.225
Although the Sherrill court applied strict scrutiny226 instead of mid-level
scrutiny in reviewing the case,227 there seems to be no appreciable difference
between procedural protections in either context. The Nation Magazine
court's invocation of Sherrill, coupled with the court's assertion that time,
place and manner analysis is the proper standard of review, support this
interpretation.228 The Nation Magazine court deferred to the Sherrill court's
rationale, emphasizing that any infringement of a constitutional right, such
family, and that harm must be so serious as to justify exclusion from the White House. Id.
However, the Secret Service merely could not have informed individualy rejected applicants
that the Secret Service had based rejection of a press pass on "reasons of security" without
providing a basis for that exclusion. Id.; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (asserting that "security" is "broad, vague generality whose contours
should not be invoked to abrogate" First Amendment).
220. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 128.
221. Id. at 127.
222. Id. at 130.
223. Id. at 129-30; see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975)
(holding that Georgia statute which prohibited media release of deceased rape victim's name
was overly broad, and that state had failed to articulate sufficient reasons for limiting First
Amendment right of access).
224. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129.
225. Id. at 130-31.
226. Id. at 130.
227. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1574 (asserting that proper standard for
reviewing DOD press pool system is time, place and manner analysis, prompting mid-level
scrutiny).
228. See id. at 1573-74 (implying that court must recognize policies in Sherrill in order
to decide case on merits and asserting that proper standard for reviewing DOD press pool
system is time, place and manner analysis, prompting mid-level scrutiny).
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as the First Amendment right of access to information, requires procedural
due process.? 9 The Sherrill court also emphasized that limitations on access
must be no more restrictive than necessary.2?0 These policies promoted in
Sherrill arguably apply to the DOD press pool system that involves mid-
level time, place and manner analysis. 231
Despite applying the policies promoted in Sherrill to the DOD press
pool system, the prospect of the DOD deciding which members of the
media the DOD shall allow to exercise their First Amendment right of
access is still disconcerting because the DOD will be motivated to protect
its own self-interest. However, government agencies routinely have substan-
tial discretion in choosing which members of the media will receive access
to information because the legislature usually grants such power to the
agency.232 The DOD should temper its discretion to determine media access
with principles of equality.233 The requirement that the DOD provide not
only a standard for entry into the press pools, but also a system of
accelerated administrative review for individualized complaints promotes
even-handed application.? 4
After the DOD has provided a system of accelerated administrative
review to the media, the federal courts should review the DOD's adminis-
trative findings under the doctrine of hard look judicial review,2" which
229. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1573 (quoting Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d at 129);
see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1974) (holding that Georgia
statute which prohibited media release of deceased rape victim's name was overly broad, and
that state had failed to articulate sufficient reasons for limiting First Amendment right of
access).
230. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1573 (quoting Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d at 130).
231. See id. at 1573 (recognizing procedural requirements government must fulfill, as
promoted in Sherrill, when government denies press access to limited public forum, and
characterizing battlefield as limited public forum).
232. See Collins, supra note 103, at 772 (asserting that government must articulate reasons
for access restrictions and apply regulations evenhandedly, given legislature's grant of substan-
tial discretion to agency).
233. See id. at 772 (asserting that government must articulate reasons for access restrictions
and apply regulations evenhandedly); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. C. L. REv. 20, 28 (1975) (asserting that courts must exert careful
judicial scrutiny when government based on time, place and manner considerations selectively
excludes certain persons and organizations from access to government information and facili-
ties).
234. See Collins, supra note 103, at 772 (asserting that government must articulate reasons
for access restrictions and apply regulations evenhandedly).
235. See id. at 772 (asserting that federal courts should review administrative decisions
limiting First Amendment right of access under hard look judicial review) (quoting Greater
Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), (defining doctrine of hard
look judicial review), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)). In Greater Boston the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that assuming consistency with the law
and legislative mandate, an agency may do more than find facts and make judgments. Id. at
851. An agency may also select policies in the public's best interest. Id. The Greater Boston
court stated that a court's function, then, is to require the agency to "articulate with reasonable
clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of the crucial facts." Id. Such a
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requires the agency to articulate a policy and then apply that policy
reasonably to the facts at issue. 216 The doctrine also enables the court to
carefully examine all pertinent facts in the administrative record before
upholding an agency's decision. 237 The four goals of hard look judicial
review include a reasoned explanation, adequate consideration, consistency,
and absence of arbitrariness. 23s The federal courts also should be open to
reviewing the DOD's findings on an accelerated level, as the courts have
for important press cases in the past. 2 9 Accelerated judicial review is justified
given the theory that denial of access is, in effect, a prior restraint. 4
During times of national crisis, newsworthy events of vital public interest
occur daily, and the public suffers when the government silences news
sources that may offer the public valuable insight.
B. Serving the Public by Creating More Diverse Pools
The quality of information reaching the American public also would
improve if the DOD allowed for more diversity in press pool membership.'
24
requirement prevents the agency from acting in a discriminatory fashion. Id. The Greater
Boston court provided that a court could intervene more broadly than in the context of
procedural inadequecies or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, if the court
recognizes that the agency has not "taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." Id. However, if the agency has not neglected
its duties, a court must exercise restraint and affirm the agency's findings, even if a court
would have made different findings or created different standards. Id. Likewise, a court is
subject to the doctrine of harmless error, and must not reverse an agency's decision based on
an agency's immaterial errors. Id.
236. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d. at 850-53; see also supra note 235 and accompanying text
(articulating court's approach in Greater Boston).
237. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d. at 850-53; see also supra note 235 and accompanying text
(articulating court's approach in Greater Boston).
238. See Greater Boston, 444 F.2d. at 851; see also Collins, supra note 103, at 772
(explaining goals and merits of hard look judicial review); supra note 235 and accompanying
text (same); JAI.s T. O'REiLUy, ADmnmSTAnTvE RusL.mAXiO 295-98 (1983) (defining hard
look judicial review consistent with court's approach in Greater Boston).
239. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text (discussing accelerated judicial review
of Pentagon Papers case). The Pentagon Papers case considered the validity of two injunctions
against publication, the first against the New York Times and the second against the Washington
Post. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). The District Court for
the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision that the injunction against the Washington
Post was invalid on the date of the hearing, June 21, 1971. Id. at 714, 754 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The District Court for the Southern District of New York remanded the case and
continued the stay after the court heard arguments, on June 19, 1971. Id. The appeals court
heard the cases on June 22, 1971, and issued the decision the following day. Id. The Supreme
Court heard arguments on June 26, 1971 and issued its decision on June 30, 1971. Id. at 713;
see also Pincus, supra note 92, at 815 n.9 (recounting procedural history of Pentagon papers).
Pincus argues federal courts would have even greater reason to react quickly to press restrictions
involving ongoing news events such as wars. Id.
240. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (asserting that restrictions on newsgathering
are even more onerous on press than prior restraint).
241. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377, 389 (1969) (asserting
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On February 26, 1991, the DOD had included 186 media organizations on
the DOD pool list. 2 Of the entire list, only the ultra-conservative Wash-
ington Times arguably represented a non-mainstream political view.2 3 The
Nation Magazine court characterized the DOD requirements for entry into
the American media pools as non-content-based, thus triggering mid-level
time, place and manner analysis.3 However, the DOD requirements result
in a press pool articulating a mainstream political view.2 5 In reality, the
press pool regulations run the risk of functioning as the type of content-
based discrimination against which the First Amendment seeks to guard.
24
importance of variety of viewpoints reaching public by upholding fairness doctrine requiring
broadcasters to allow presentation of contrasting views); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (rejecting argument that press is immune from antitrust laws and'asserting
that First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination 'of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,
that a free press is a condition of a free society").
242. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 6 (describing that representatives to DOD pool system
represented mainstream American media). The DOD press pool system included the following
representatives: Twenty-one pool participants represented the four major wire services, AP,
UPI, and Reuters, with one representative coming from Knight-Ridder. Id. Forty-three members
of the pool represented major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and the New York
Times. Id. The DOD admitted 35 photographers representing the foregoing wire services and
newspapers, as well as Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report to the pool system.
Id. The DOD included 11 representatives from the following magazines, Newsweek, Time,
Esquire, U.S. News and World Report. Id. The pool also included 63 television representatives,
almost all of whom were from ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN or their affiliates. Id. Thirteen radio
representatives comprised the pool, primarily representing ABC, CBS, NBC, NPR and Voice
of America. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1574 (explaining that DOD may place
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on press if there is significant government
interest, thus triggering mid-level scrutiny).
245. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing how DOD press pool members represented
mainstream American media); see also Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1564 (same). The
Nation Magazine plaintiffs claimed that the DOD unconstitutionally discriminated among
various members of the media by choosing only "mainstream" media organizations as pool
members on the pretext that such organizations reached the largest audiences. Id. at 1564; see
also POOL MEMaEsRn' AIn OPERATING PRocEDURES, supra note 8, reprinted in Nation
Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-79; Memorandum 'of Amicus Curiae Fairness and Accuracy
in Reporting, Inc. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at 2, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter FAIR
Memorandum] (asserting in amicus curiae brief that DOD press pools articulate mainstream
political view). Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Inc. (FAIR) has conducted studies drawing
attention to the national news media's reliance on a narrow range of sources, experts and
viewpoints, often to the exclusion of independent, critical or minority perspectives. FAIR
Memorandum, at 2. FAIR's studies showing the narrowness of major media coverage have
been distributed widely, reported in hundreds of daily newspapers, entered into Congressional
Record, and discussed in academic circles. Id.
246. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 6 (asserting that any government selection process,
such as DOD press pool system, is in danger of drawing content or viewpoint distinctions that
First Amendment seeks to guard against); see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 25 (1989) (White, J., concurring) (invalidating statute that exempted periodicals with religious
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In response to the dilemma of the DOD press pools producing a
mainstream political view, First Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer
proposes that the DOD create a lottery with all American media organiza-
tions and individual citizens entitled to an equal chance to exercise their
right of access to information.247 Schauer acknowledges, however, that the
DOD ultimately will employ some type of selection process when logistical
concerns limit access.248 Any DOD selection process will likely give prefer-
ential treatment to publications like the New York Times instead of another
publication, such as Muhammad Speaks.249
Although the DOD's preferential treatment of certain media organiza-
tions is inevitable, it is possible for the DOD press pools to represent
mainstream America and alternative views. The DOD press pool system
must represent more diverse media organizations to safeguard against the
threat of content-based restrictions masquerading as restrictions based on
time, place and manner analysis.20 To promote diversity, the DOD press
pools should include media organizations not meeting the DOD's gulf war
pool criteria. Media organizations not meeting the DOD's gulf war pool
criteria would qualify for an alternate pool list. The DOD would draw pool
members from this list on a rotating basis. To gain admission, media
organizations only must have the capability to report from the battlezone
and an established American audience that will benefit from the organiza-
tion's insights. The DOD would base its decision concerning what percentage
of media organizations not meeting regular DOD pool criteria to include
on such factors as the number of applicants, the size of individual press
pools, and the overall effect caused by addition of pool members.2 The
sponsorship or religious message from sales tax based on reasoning that statute functioned as
content-based discrimination and triggered strict scrutiny analysis); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 318-21 (1988) (holding that government statute prohibiting demonstrations in front of
foreign embassies that criticize particular foreign government does not restrict speech based
on valid time, place and manner considerations, but on content of speech); Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-34 (1987) (invalidating statute providing for sales
tax emption for some, but not all, periodicals based on reasoning that statute functioned as
content-based discrimination and triggered strict scrutiny.'nalysis); Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-93 (1983) (supplying broad holding
that taxes drawing distinctions among members of press are suspect even when state has not
created exemption based on content or for purpose of suppressing speech); see generally
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
189, 189-252 (1983) (explaining distinction between content-based and content-neutral restric-
tions on speech).
247. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 6 (offering alternative to government's preferential
system for choosing powerful, mainstream media organizations as recepients of information
to which government limits access).
248. Id.
249. See id. at 6-7 (commenting that as long as government restricts access based on time,
place and manner considerations, government will favor mainstream news sources).
250. See id. at 7 (commenting that government is often vehicle of content-based discrim-
ination when government limits access to certain number of media).
251. In weighing these and other factors, the DOD should base its decision not only on
military experience, but also should consider testimony from media experts.
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courts have promoted the overall effect of diversity of news sources because
diversity improves the quality of information reaching the public and is
vital to the functioning of a free society.
212
C. Applying the Proposed Alternaties
If the Nation Magazine plaintiffs had presented the court with a system
to increase the diversity of press pool membership as well as an accelerated.
system of administrative and judicial review, the plaintiffs could have
presented the court with a well-focused controversy.2Y3 Accordingly, the
Nation Magazine court could have proceeded to the merits . 2 4 The court
first would have examined the history of prior American military conflicts
and concluded that the press has had an historically demonstrated First
Amendment right of access to the battlefield.0 5 The court then would have
considered that in wartime this right of access is subject to reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions .2 6 Under time, place and manner analysis,
the court then would have applied mid-level scrutiny,257 which would require
that the access limitations serve a significant state interest, leave open
alternative methods of communication and not be content-based.25
In applying mid-level scrutiny, the courts require that limitations on the
First Amendment right of access to the battlefield must be no more restrictive
than valid time, place and manner considerations merit.259 The government's
reasons for restricting access once the government has created a limited
public forum must be well-articulated.2 ° The system of speedy administrative
and judicial review protects the press's right of access to a greater extent
than the current DOD pool system without infringing on the DOD's time,
place and manner concerns. Furthermore, the proposed system better pro-
vides a media organization with procedural due process. 26' Given these
252. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (asserting value of diversity of news
sources in informing public); see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3017
(1990) (holding that interest in promoting diversity in broadcast industry is important interest
and is sufficient to uphold racial classification scheme whereby FCC awarded enhancement of
minority ownership of broadcast licenses).
253. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575 (dismissing case due to lack of well-
focused controversy due to plaintiffs' failure to devise specific alternatives to DOD pool
system).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 1571-72 (asserting that press has at least some minimal right of access to
battlefield); see also supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text (demonstrating historical right
of access to battlefield).
256. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1574.




261. See supra notes 213-30 and accompanying text (asserting importance of granting
media procedural due processs when government has taken away media organization's right
of access).
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specific alternatives to the press pool system, the Nation Magazine court
arguably could have determined that the DOD does not have a significant
state interest in insisting on the current DOD pool system over the plaintiffs'
less restrictive alternative. The Nation Magazine court could have struck
down the existing DOD pool system and suggested that the DOD implement
plaintiffs' proposal for speedy administrative and judicial review.
Similarly, the Nation Magazine court could have suggested that the
-DOD implement plaintiffs' proposal for a more diverse press pool system.
Courts have long recognized the value of information coming from a variety
of sources.262 Furthermore, plaintiffs could have argued that, in reality, the
current pool system borders on content-based discrimination. 263 The DOD
pool system presumably denies the American public more independent and
critical coverage of military conflicts.264 Arguably, there is no significant
state interest which would prevent the DOD from accepting plaintiffs'
proposal to allow media organizations not meeting press pool criteria to
comprise a percentage of the pools. 265 Balancing the value of diversity





Although the courts are a vehicle to improve the DOD press pool
system, advocates for change should not wait for another war to set the
scene for a remedy. Both the mainstream and alternative press must unite
now to increase media access to the battlefield in the next military conflict. 267
There is a general consensus among the media that the DOD press pool
system significantly diminished the quality of reliable, objective information
about the gulf war.268 The DOD's restrictions on press coverage during the
262. See supra notes 241, 245-46, 252 and accompanying text (asserting importance of
diversity of sources of information in contributing to well-informed public).
263. See supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text (asserting that limiting access to
certain media organizations based on time, place and manner analysis functions as content-
based discrimination).
264. See FAIR Memorandum, supra note 245, at 7 (emphasizing how public benefits from
receiving news from diverse sources of information).
265. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1574 (asserting that DOD must demonstrate
significant governmental interest before enforcing restrictions on media's right of access).
266. See supra notes 241, 245-46, 252 and accompanying text (stressing value of diversity
of news sources in achieving informed American public); see Collins, supra note 103, at 786
(stressing that media should have access to public places unless such access seriously disrupts
functioning of place or unless access threatens safety).
267. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing importance of press working
as one unit to increase media access).
268. See THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 28-32 (discussing media dissatisfaction
with DOD press pool system). In a survey conducted by the Gannett Foundation of 37
journalists who covered the gulf war, 75 percent said the military guidelines were a hindrance,
and 25 percent characterized the guidelines as an extreme hindrance. Id. at 32. More than half
said the press pool reports were not helpful, or only somewhat helpful. Id. at 28. For example,
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Persian Gulf War have been a topic of research by media organizations
and discussed among the media, military and the public.
269
Although discussion is a step in the right direction, the media must do
more than speak in generalities. 270 The media must be armed with specific
alternatives to the press pool system, just as the Nation Magazine court
requested. 27' The media then should present these specific alternatives to the
DOD, while proposing general recommendations and raising grievances
about the press pool system during the Persian Gulf War. The media must
warn the DOD that the courts may be given the opportunity to endorse
this reasoning during the next military conflict. The DOD will be motivated
to avoid a lawsuit that, unlike Nation Magazine, could yield a media
victory.
The Persian Gulf War damaged press freedoms, and the media may
find that pressuring the DOD to restructure the press pool system will be
Baltimore Sun correspondent Daniel Fesperman said the pool system was "basically a stupid
system," designed "to spread disinformation." Id. NBC News correspondent Brad Willis said,
"The deal should have never been made with the pools. It was a mistake." Id. Willis
characterized the pool system as an "effort by the military to manipulate and control coverage
in the name of 'operational security."' Id. The reporters surveyed by Gannett said problems
arose because there were too few pools; that inclusion in the pools seemed to favor certain
news organizations (e.g., large organizations, those with connections) and that assignments to
the pools often made little sense and those in the pool did not always know the pool rules or
chose to ignore them. Id. at 32. The many incidents where the best reporting of the gulf war
came from reporters who got away from the press pools demonstrates that the press pools
hindered reporters.; see Richard Zoglin, The Press Jumping Out of the Pool, Tian, Feb. 18,
1991, at 39 (describing how reporters increasingly abandoned press pools as war progressed).
The battle for Khafji is an example. Id. Although the DOD stationed pool reporters with the
First U.S. Marine Division outside the Saudi city, the DOD did not allow the reporters into
the town until 18 hours after the fighting started between Iraqi and coalition forces. Id. Early
accounts of the battle came mostly from reporters who were reporting on their own. Id. One
renegade reporter explained how the pools' version of the battle differed dramatically from
that of those reporters who had actually witnessed how long the battle took, what happened
or how many Iraqis defended the city. Id. The best footage of the battle came from two
French TV crews and a British team, who were in Khafji well before the U.S. pool cameramen.
Id.; see also Richard Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, Thn, Feb. 4, 1991, at 44
(asserting press pools diminished supply of reliable, objective information about gulf war);
THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 27-30 (same); Dorfman, supra note 2, at 35-37 (same).
269. See THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at 96-97 (offering recommendations and
conclusions to help press regain freedoms during next military conflict). One organization, the
Gannett Foundation, has even developed broad recommendations to stimulate discussion among
the military, the media and the public. Id. These recommendations propose, among other
things, that the American news media learn to represent themselves collectively; that the media
educate the public about the importance of press freedom's; that in keeping with the Sidle
Panel the press pools are only to be used as a temporary measure when required by legitimate
national security needs; that the DOD reform the pools to create a mechanism to arbitrate
judiciously the needs of the different media, and that the media strive to increase the diversity
of news sources. Id.
270. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing broad recommendations offered
by Gannett Foundation); Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575 (criticizing plaintiffs' absolutist
approach).
271. See Nation Magazine at 1575 (criticizing plaintiffs' absolutist approach).
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difficult. 272 One of the barriers the media will encounter will be that the
DOD will be motivated to protect its own self-interests. 273 Another barrier
is that the American public also appears to have supported the DOD's press
restrictions during the gulf war.274 However, eventually the public will realize
that it cannot risk the consequences of being uninformed or deceived by
the military.275 Because public awakening may come later than the media
would prefer,276 the media's most effective remedy is to present the DOD
with specific alternatives to the press pool system based on legal reasoning. 2"
By presenting the DOD with a proposal to restructure the DOD press pool
system, the media will not only be defending its First Amendment right of
access to the battlefield but will be fighting for the public's right to make
informed decisions during times of military crisis.
MicHELLiE TuxAN MNsoRE
272. See THE MEDIA AT WAR, supra note 4, at xi-xii (summarizing press restrictions during
gulf war and public's support for such restrictions).
273. See Collins, supra note 103, at 771 (asserting that agencies may not provide media
organizations with all benefits of procedural due process after agency has restricted media
organization's access).
274. See TmE MEDIA AT WA, supra note 4, at xi-xii (summarizing press restrictions during
gulf war and public's support for such restrictions).
275. See Redlich, supra note 51, at 159 (stating that public will not tolerate military
restrictions on First Amendemt freedoms).
276. See THE MEDIA AT WA, supra note 4, at xi-xii, 82-85 (assessing difficulty of media's
task in swaying public opinion to support greater media freedoms). As Michael Kagay, Director
of Surveys for the New York Times, remarked, "The press's complaint never became the
public's complaint." Id. at 83.
277. See Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575 (expressing Nation Magazine court's
displeasure with plaintiffs' failure to devise alternatives to press pool system).
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